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Reviewed by Gary N. Horlick*
Professor Reisman has written a truly enjoyable
book, "enjoyable" in the sense of forcing one to think
about the basic conflicts underlying a series of recent
events, the news reports of which have been marked more
often by breadth of coverage than by depth of analysis.
Folded Lies has the further, and not unrelated, virtue
of not being solely about the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977f (FCPA or Act) but rather about bribery in
general. As such, it provides a framework for continu-
ing examination of the interpretation and application of
the Act.
Folded Lies is a useful book, but the reader should
be warned that it is not an easy book. The so-called
New Haven School has often been accused of writing in-
comprehensible prose. I believe that charge to be
overstated. In the extreme case, one may well have to
* Member., District of Columbia Bar. AB,, Dartmouth, 1968;
B.A,, Dip, Int'l Law, Cambridge, 1970; J.D., Yale, 1973.
1, Public L, No. 95-213, tit. I, 91 Stat, 1494. A thorough
review of the Act is in Atkeson, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977: An International Application of SECts Corporate
Governance Reforms, 12 Inttl Lawyer 703-739 (1978).
The bulk of Folded Lies was apparently written in 1977 (when
one portion of it appeared in these pages) and thus deals with the
Act (which was passed in late 1977) within the context of the over-
all phenomenon. See Reisman, Myth System and Operational Code,
3 Yale Stud, World Pub. Ord, 229-249 (1977).
spend five to ten minutes on a paragraph, chewing on
it, digesting it, and going back a few pages to relate
it to the framework in which it is set. Virtue, how-
ever, is rewarded, and the reward for parsing out each
paragraph is the high density of conceptual meat. In
short then, this is hardly a book which one can skim
for the highlights, but the reader in search of an
understanding of the phenomenon of bribery, who is
willing to invest the time in careful perusal, will
find that the effort has been worthwhile.
I. Myth System and Operational Codes.
Professor Reisman suggests that the furor over
bribery arises from the almost inevitable discrepancies
between a society's "operational code" and its "myth
system." The myth system consists, in essence, of the
values which the society publicly espouses, while the
operational code represents acceptable deviations from
the myth system necessary to "get things done."
Thus, for example, in many societies (including, in
certain circumstances, our ownj bribery is a part of
the operational code in that it is an officially pro-
hibited but acceptable and not infrequent technique
of accomplishing certain ends. By contrast, for
example, murder is certainly prohibited officially and
is certainly a means sometimes used to accomplish cer-
tain ends, but it is not acceptable and therefore is
not part of the overall'society's operational code.
As Reisman points out, neither the myth system nor
the operational code alone constitutes the legal struc-
ture. While the cynic would say that there is no law
but rather only the expedience of the operational code,
others would perceive operational codes as "illegal"
Cwhich they are, strictly speaking) and therefore not
part of the overall system. A disinterested anthro-
pologist, however, would want to look at behavior,
which includes both myth system and operational code.
Indeed, many activities outside of the formal legal
system, such as solving crimes by paying money to in-
formers, are practiced by those charged with upholding
the law (thus, the common practice of reducing sen-
tences for informers is increasingly being incorporated
into the formal legal system, as plea bargaining becomes
more openly acknowledged). According to Reisman, what
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distinguishes the "operational code' from outright
illegality (e.g., murder) is that deviations of the
operational code from the myth system are selectively
tolerated, depending upon the circumstances, identity
of the agents, purpose of the acts, and effects on the
larger organizations. At the same time, the "operators"
strive, often quite strenuously, to maintain the integ-
rity of the myth system; those who bribe do so in the
dark, or at least in the shadows, and thereby implicit-
ly affiim the myth systemlts strictures against bribery
by seeking to hide their activities.
Of course, this difference between formal adherence
to a myth system and actual, even if not constant,
deviation in favor of an operational code creates in
most cases a dissonance in the person seeking to have
the best of both systems. While some bribes are clear-
ly acceptable enough to bear the light of subsequent
publicity (the example in Folded Lies is of Bertolt
Brecht bribing immigration officials to escape from
Nazi Germany2 ) in most cases even "good" bribes will
create a certain dissonance in the individual, since
bribes are categorized by the myth system as "evil." 3
2. P. 128. A "lawful" illegal bribe, as in the Brecht example,
must be justified by a code of behavior clearly transcending the
legal code which is transgressed by the bribe, Where the bribery
is animated by either a higher natural law or divine command, the
search for that transcending code is not problematic, Similarly,
a culture where the highest value is given to family (or to class
or to a similar group) would permit bribery in the name of that
group. Problems are more frequent in "modern" Western societies,
where loyalty is formally owed to one's state, so that bribery
of the official of another state on behalf of one's state is not
only acceptable but frequently rewarded, while bribery on behalf
of one's corporation may be accepted as part of an operational
code but is subject to sanction as outside of the myth system,
Some philosophers would insist that an act of disobedience to
the official myth system (e.g., the Brecht bribe) must be a public
act of disobedience. As Reisman points out, such counsels of per-
fection are unrealistic in the modern totalitarian state, which
can usually assure that such a public act is the person's last one.
3. Reisman describes a curious aspect of bribery: its essen-
tially democratic nature. After all, bribery is far more accessible
than preference based on family or class ties, yet we frown much
more on people getting jobs by buying them than we do on hiring on
the basis of word-of-mouth referral, old school ties, or pure
nepotism. (Bribery, of course, is not an ideal; it does discrimi-
nate against those with no money.- Moreover, it too contravenes
the principles of meritocracy as does nepotism or other circum-
ventions of the official myth system.)
294 [VOL.5
In the face of this dissonance, some will attempt
to justify the action, often a difficult feat (which
may explain why, to outsiders, the moralizing appears
tortured). Another possible reaction to the dissonance
is to commit the act through a middleman, ideally by
instructions ambiguous enough to allow participants to
deny responsibility not only to others, but, indeed,
to themselves.
Dissonance will increase where the myth system in-
cludes two value systems which are potentially in
conflict. On a day-to-day basis, it would appear that
most peoplets values are dominated by the values of
the group most proximate to them in daily life. In
this country, we have a myth system of pure republican-
ism (i.e., one acts for the public good) juxtaposed
with one of pure capitalism (i.e., one acts for money),
As Reisman points out, the conflict between the two is
heightened by the growth of the modern corporation (a
bastion of capitalist values) which is for many people
now the most proximate group.4 The two value systems
may be reconciled in theory by the "invisible hand"
theory in which each person acting in his or her own
best interests together leads to the greatest public
good. In neither theory nor practice, however, do
bribes offered to public officials to enable the briber
profitably to evade the rules of the game fit within
the myth system, so corporate employees acting in their
own (and the corporations' ) interests are not acting
in the public good (at least according to the myth sys-
tem) .5
4. Thins may explain hoW a "'pillar of the community" can under-
take or authorize actions which are condemned formally by the
myth system but encouraged by the business firm to which he or
she has committed his or her life, as long as it is permitted by
the operational code. Thus, a pillar of the community convicted
of bribery will frequently find considerable support in his or
her milieu, while, to take the extreme case, the pillar-of-the-
community-turned-ax-murderer will not find such sustenance.
5. This may not be the case in a transnational context. If
Corporation A of Country X bribes Official B of Country Y, it may
be the greatest "public good" (i.e., increased exports) for
Country X (although not necessarily for world order) and perhaps
within the myth system of certain Countries Y.
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Very little of this is new to civilization in the
20th century. The distinction betwee' the myth system
and operational code goes back to at least biblical
times and bribery for one's family then was probably at
least as widespread as bribery for one's corporation is
now. A more recent note is the continuing growth of
bribery opportunities. As more and more governmental
"checkpoints" are set up along the road to any given
goal, there are more opportunities for seeking or
offering bribes. For example, connoisseurs of minor
corruption, on reading the list of stamped papers
required to show compliance with the Arab Boycott
Office's regulations, at once recognized the creation,
whether inadvertently or not, of multiple opportunities
.for informal salary increases on the part of those
officers at consulates of Arab states charged with
supplying the appropriate stamps. This country can
claim no immunity from the phenomenon. The media in
Washington are currently publicizing the discovery that
government hiring here requires not only the necessary
qualifications required by Civil Service regulations
but also connection with one or another "network" -- a
requirement no more envisioned by the ideals of Civil
Service hiring than would be a requirement of tendering
bribes.
II. The Three Categories of Bribes
The amount of dissonance between myth system and
operational code varies, both for the individual and
for the society, depending on the context in which the
bribe occurs. This can be seen from Reismant s three
categories of bribes. First, there is the "transaction
bribe"--the "grease money" which pervades life not only
in foreign countries, but also in the routine payments
in the United States to housing inspectors, the Christ-
mas gifts to postmen and trash collectors, the free
food for policemen in restaurants, and so forth, While
technically illegal, it is very rare that this activity
is prosecuted or penalized in any way (indeed, one
suspects that, even after brief flurries of publicity,
the practice obdurately continues), Obviously, with
6. For an economic analysis of the role of corruption in
governmental structures, see Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study
in Political Economy (1978).
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respect to transaction bribes, the size of the bribe is,
important. In many countries, small bribes given to
underpaid officials to perform their required duties
are widely perceived as part of the benefits of holding
the job, while large bribes may fuel resentment among
the general population of those who are enriching
themselves from official positions Ca situation which
some of the charges leveledat the United States by
Iran may illustratel. Large bribes, however, are not
generally resented when it is understood by everyone
that the money really is going not to the bribe
recipient, but rather to the political party or other
machine that appointed him or her.7
By contrast, the "variance bribe" attempts to seek
an evasion of some existing norm (e.g., instead of a
transaction bribe to a building inspector for a certi-
ficate for a building which is essentially safe, a pay-
off to certify as safe that which is seriously danger-
ous). The line between variance bribes and transaction
bribes can become fuzzy. Indeed, some governmental
systems can be structured so as to require variance
bribes.8 Finally, the extreme form of bribery is the
"outright purchase," where the loyalty of the public
official has been so totally subverted that it is
directed exclusively towards the briber rather than
towards the State. In virtually all systems with
republican governmental structures these bribes are per-
ceived as violating both the myth system and the opera-
tional code.
It is not surprising that variance bribes are the
ones that create the most difficulty and the most
social dissonance. Transaction bribes, unless for
excessive sums, will be dismissed by most of the society
7. The real problem with these large transaction-bribes aimed
at financing political machines- is the opportunity for "skimming"
generated by the discreet nature of the payoff.
8. A structure where the need for a variance bribe is built
into the system also creates an opportunity for the ruling elite
to maintain control over the governmental structure by blackmail;
implicitly, everyone in the governmental structure has received
bribes, and thus each individual member knows that he or she can
he discarded by the elite through selective use of the legal
processes.
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as inconsequential, while "outright purchases" will be
condemned by most of the society. It is the variance
bribe, especially for the award of large contracts
overseas, where most of the fuss has been generated in
recent years. Such bribes are clearly prohibited by
most countries' myth systems Cas are transaction bribes),
and they are seen as perverting the social goals of the
myth system more than would a routine transaction bribe.
1I. Antibribery Campaigns
Reisman categorizes antibribery campaigns into two
groups: the true "reform" and the "much-sound-and-fury-
signifying-nothing" crusade. Both types of campaigns
require a certain context. First, a popular campaign
is not relevant except where the government is based to
some extent on popular approval; a governmental system
explicitly based solely on the whim of a dictator need
not be much concerned with popular campaigns. Second,
campaigns tend to occur when things are not going very
well in general, and when an explanation is thus sought
for a perceived societal crisis. The campaign results from
the anxiety of the people over the fidelity to the myth
system of those who dominate them, and the campaign must
result in a catharsis of that anxiety, either through
the real results of a reform, or through the ritual
purge resulting from a crusade. As Reisman points out,
the United States is peculiarly subject to such cam-
paigns, 9 perhaps because of the extreme degree of faith
placed in its formal legal processes and rules (the
"myth system"), and perhaps because of the continuing
search for a separation between the political market-
place and the commercial one.10
9. One aspect in which the FCPA is typical of recent cam-
paigns in the United States is the iicreased involvement of lawyers.
While one can argue about the impact of the Act on the incidence of
actual bribery, there is no question among practitioners that com-
pliance with the Act has generated a whole additional level of work
with clients required to do business overseas.
10. The tension between the political and the commercial may
be inevitable in a democratic capitalist society. "Money is the
natural form of influence in the marketplace, but it is an illicit
form of influence in the democratic forum." P.102.
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What, then, is the difference between a "crusade"
and a true "reform"? The mark of the "crusade" for
Reisman is its ultimate ineffectiveness in changing the
operational code, so one can only distinguish the two
with certainty ex post facto. Nevertheless, the book
does offer indicia setting apart the two different
species of campaign. Since the essence of the crusade
is that it upholds the myth system while enabling users
of the operational code to continue their practices,
certain recurring forms of crusade will Be discernible.
Thus, many criminal cases involving bribery can be
initiated with much public-ity but with the majority
of them dropped or settled on the basis of guilty pleas
to minor offenses. Also, blame can be diverted to one
scapegoat group, allowing the rest of the population to
continue its activities unhindered. Similarly, publi-
city and punishments can be focused on subordinate
groups (i.e., the middlemen), while the principals
escape unharmed. More subtly, within pluralist polities,
one elite group can use a crusade as an opportunity to
eliminate some of its rivals without impairing its own
use of the same operational code. Finally, it may be
necessary actually to sacrifice some members of one's
own elite group in order to preserve the utility of the
operational code for the remainder of the group.
One recurring and popular technique of a crusade is
the passage of a law which is not meant to be enforced.
This is done either by structuring the new law in such
a way as to make enforcement impossible, by carefully
entrusting its enforcement to an incompetent, or by
failing to provide the resources necessary for its en-
forcement. Thurman Arnold is quoted in this context:
Most unenforced criminal laws survive in
order to satisfy moral objections to
established modes of conduct. They are
unenforced because we want to continue
our conduct, and unrepealed because we
want to preserve our morals.1 1
By contrast, true "reform" is much more difficult to
pin down, because it must actually change the operational
code to conform to the myth system. Reisman outlines
some of the ways in which this can happen:
11. P. 173.
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1. An elite group will actually change its ways
(the operational code in order to remain in power,
2. A new elite, seeking to displace the old one,
will require a change in the operational code in order
to consolidate its power and displace the old elite.
As Reisman points out, this is not to say that revolu-
tion must change the operational code. The Soviet
example is only the best known one of a new elite
adopting the norms (or secret police practices) of its
predecessors.12
3. Even with the first or second of these phenomena,
Reisman believes that a reform campaign must recruit the
support of those who are the custodians of the myth sys-
tem Ce.g., clergymen, journalists, or teachers).
One obvious difficulty is assessing whether in any
specific case true "reform" has been achieved. In this
connection, the FCPA is likely to present a particularly
difficult problem of assessing success, because it will
never be easy to measure the degree to which bribery is
practiced and especially to compare it with past years
in a meaningful way.13
Perhaps more important than assessing the success of
a "reform" is to bear in mind the importance of even a
failed reform, i.e., a "crusade." A successful crusade,
it will be recalled, reasserts the values of the myth
system, although it generates few changes in the opera-
tional code. Similarly, a failed reform will have the
same effect. By contrast, a failed crusade which fails
at least to reassert the primacy of the society's ex-
pressed values could generate demands for restructuring
of the myth system, thus opening up far more dangerous
ground.
12. Readers may wish to study the Abbasid Revolution of 747-
750 A.D. as an early model of this phenomenon.
13. The General Accounting Office currently is making an
attempt to assess the impact of the FCPA and has sent a survey on
the subject to 250 of the Fortune 1,000 largest industrial corpora-
tions.
The example which Reisman gives is whether the -major "reforms"
represented by the U.S. antitrust laws have in fact succeeded in
reducing the concentration of power in American industry and in-
creasing competition. P.115. That is certainly a difficult ques-




IV. The International Focus on Bribery
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the entire
furor over bribery in the mid-1970s has been its con-
centration on payments made outside of the United
States. The curious result is that the "solution"
Cthe FCPA) has been one whose most direct benefit is to
foreign nations rather than to the United States or to
any American citizen or organization,
Lest this analysis appear too startling, it should
be borne in mind that, economically, the entity harmed
by bribery of the type most commonly alleged to be
practiced by major United States multinational corpora-
tions overseas1 4 is the foreign country letting the con-
tract which, as a rule, winds up paying an amount equal
to the bribe in excess of what it should otherwise have
had to pay for the goods or service.1 5 It is unlikely
that it is the shareholders of the bribing corporation
who are harmed, despite the occasional derivative suit
brought by shareholders in connection with payments
overseas.Y 6 In fact, it is perfectly arguable that the
shareholders would have approved the bribes, had they
known of them, in order to gain the necessary business. 1 7
14. I.e., the payment to foreign government decision-makers of
"variance" bribes in order to obtain contracts not otherwise
merited.
15. Where a U.S. firm offers a bribe in order to take business
from another U.S. firm, the second U,S. firm is also in-
jured. But the FCPA is not limited to that situation, as it
should be if that were the harm to be prevented.
16. The prospect of recovery of attorneys' fees may well be the
decisive factor in the decision to bring derivative suits.
17. It is of some interest that the initiator of the current
United States antibribery campaign was the Securities and Exchange
Commission, an agency which was created in order to reinforce
investors' belief in a myth system of capital markets in which
everyone has equal access to information and in which manipulation
is prohibited-even though, arguably, the SEC is not really pro-
tecting investors' interests in situations where it inhibits a
United States company from paying bribes to obtain a contract which
would otherwise be granted to a non-United States corporation.
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It would seem that there must be something more that
motivated the United States to enact the FCPA than a
desire to assist foreign countries in getting full
value when they let contracts for bid. i8A more persua-
sive explanation is the great need of the United States
at that time to reaffirm its adherence to its own myth
system, even in circumstances as far afield as Japan or
the Netherlands. The antibribery campaign was a direct
result of the Watergate scandal, in which the country
as a whole perceived a need to reaffirm that the myth
system, rather than the Nixon White House's view of the
operational code, is what should govern our political
processes. More directly, one aftermath of Watergate
was to discredit the classic operator's excuse that
"everyone does it." The use of that claim to justify
Watergate made it suspect as a defense for bribery.
If, as Folded Lies suggests, bribery is as prevalent
in the United States as overseas, perhaps the explana-
tion for the focus of the United States antibribery
campaign on questionable payments abroad is to avoid a
searching examination of such practices at home. If
that is the case, then by diverting attention from the
problems at home, the entire campaign--even if a true
"reform" with respect to payments overseas--is to be
seen merely as a "crusade."19
18. It is not convincing to argue that reform was necessary in
order to maintain the United States' image abroad. The disclosures
that were themselves a part of the campaign probably damaged that
image more than the resultant legislation could benefit it.
19. Certain practical reasons for concentrating on payments
overseas should not be neglected. Overseas payments more fre-
quently involve more traceable transfers among subsidiaries, and
more frequently require a middleman, than would be the case in the
United States.
An alternative analysis may explain the emphasis on bribes paid
by-multinational corporations. To date, there has been little
question of the "right" (within the myth system) of agents of states
to bribe employees of other states, as Senator Moynihan has
alleged was occasionally the case with respect to the purchase of
U.N. General Assembly votes. See p. 63. With -multinationals'
bribes of foreign government officials, however, the question be-
came "whether the United States has a foreign policy or Lockheed
had a foreign policy." P. 173. Perhaps the FCPA is -merely an
attempt by states to retain for themselves the sole competence to
bribe foreign nationals.
It should be noted that the Act does not focus solely on over-
seas activities. The accounting requirements of Section 102, which
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The extension of this concern overseas, however,
makes true "reform" not only more difficult but the
desirability of its attainment more questionable. While
I believe that it is rare in the United States for
bribery to be an integral part of the governmental
structure, that is not the case in some foreign coun-
tries where receipt of small transaction and variance
bribes is a normal part of the salary structure or cam-
paign finance mechanism of the local government. Our
relatively free-market economic system also requires
less intervention by well-connected middlemen than is
the case in many countries. Consequently, the results
of a true "reform" could be far more disruptive in
those countries than in the United States.
In addition, the type of bribery which has actual-
ly occurred so far may create far less dissonance in
those societies than it would in ours, It is here that
the usefulness of Folded Liests categories of bribes
becomes apparent, because they enable one to carry the
analysis beyond the facile statement that virtually all
other foreign countries outlaw bribery, and that there-
fore there is nothing untoward in the United States'
pressing its views on the matter, Assuming arguendo
that most foreign statutes dealing with bribery are at
least as clearly prohibitory as those of the United
States, 2 0 it is perfectly possible that a variance
bribe in foreign country X (where such payments in re-
turn for discretionary acts are considered normal and
are barely concealed) creates no more dissonance in
that country between the operational code and the myth
system than would a garden-variety transaction bribe/
grease money payment in the United States, The FCPA,
by exporting a distinction between the two which may
loom larger here than there, implicitly seeks to apply
our myth system and operational code overseas.
19, CQontinued)
requires detailed accounting of domestic as well as international
operations, could well prove to be the most significant portion of
the Act.
20, See 18 U,S,C. § 201, Unfortunately, Section 201 itself
is far from being a model of clarity,
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VI. The FCPA as "Reformt or "Crusade"
The question which the book implicitly poses is
whether the FCPA is a true "reform" or a mere tcrusade."
As noted earlier, the final assessment can only be made
in retrospect. Nevertheless, one immediate indicator
will he the amount of resources devoted to enforcement
of the FCPA. The argument has bhei nade that, with full
funding, prior law Ce.g,, the ahtibribery statute and
wire fraud statute) would have been sufficient even
though conviction under those statutes presented numer-
ous difficulties for prosecutors. Nevertheless, the
level of funding is not a totally sufficient indicator.
Unless enforcement of the Act is completely and openly
cut off, one should not underestimate the degree of self-
enforcement which many, and perhaps most, major United
States corporations in fact practice because the Act is
on the statute books.
One additional indicator, though difficult to inves-
tigate, will be the degree to which the legal and ac-
counting professions are consulted on these matters by
corporate clients.2 1 An absence of consultation would
argue for the proposition that the operational code has
merely been driven further from view but continues to
operate as before. Recent proposals by the Securities
and Exchange Commission for informal review of FCPA
questions, and by the Justice Department for greater
confidentiality for review queries, provide further
material for arguing that only minimal disturbance in
the operational code is intended.2 2
Perhaps the real test on an international level will
be whether meaningful international agreement can be
21. Interestingly enough, Article 12 of the December 31, 1979
Exposure Draft of a new Proposed Statement on Accounting Standards
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accounts would in
some respects "pass the buck" from the accountants to the lawyers
by stating that, in dealing with FCPA -matters "[w]hether a company
is in compliance with those provisions of the FCPA is a Zegal
determination."
22. The degree to which requests for informal review are kept
confidential, and the degree to which review by one government
agency can bind all government agencies, will Be further indicators
of whether the campaign is a "crusade" or a "reform."
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reached.2 3 Arguably, truly "bad guys" will seek to
circumvent any regulatory procedures. Consequently,
enforcement becomes the key to deciding whether the
campaign is a "reform" or a "crusade" with respect to
the most likely violators. Such. an agreement, without
significant enforcement provisions including at least
mandatory international cooperation on exchange of
information and judicial assistance and enforcement,
would probably be the best international indicator that
the campaign against bribery is more "crusade" than
"reform."
23. So far, the United Nations Economic and Social Council has
been unable to decide whether to schedule a diplomatic conference
to conclude such an international agreement (which would be based
on a draft drawn up by ECOSOC's Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working
Group on the Problem of Corrupt Practices).
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